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such a coloring to the transactions connected with that great event, as would neither have been agreeable nor profitable to the citizens of a republic. Accordingly we look upon the liberal spirit which characterizes all the writings of Heeren, and none more than the last mentioned, as one of its weightiest recommendations. Without this, whatever might be its other merits, we should neither wish nor expect it to be popular here. But having this superadded to its other excellences, and being thereby adapted to the feelings as well as to the wants of our community, we earnestly commend it to the friends of education.

ART. XI.—*Historia de la Revolucion de la República de Colombia*, por JOSE MANUEL RESTREPO, Secretario del Interior del Poder Ejecutivo de la misma República. Paris. 1827. tom. 1-10.

OF Mr Restrepo's long expected work, the first part, containing the history of the revolution in New Granada, down to 1819, has at length made its appearance ; and the public will not be disappointed in their anticipation of its merit and importance. It is a perspicuous, well-arranged, and impartial history of the period which it embraces, recounting, in a simple and natural style, not only the battles fought, but the political incidents, and the views of prominent men, equally necessary to be understood, in order to possess a complete knowledge of such a revolution. The work is inscribed to Bolivar,* whose

* The following is a translation of this dedication ;

‘To his Excellency Simon Bolivar, Liberator President of the Republic of Colombia, Liberator of that of Peru and invested with the supreme command thereof, &c.

‘So soon as I resolved to occupy a part of my leisure in the bold enterprise of writing the History of the Revolution of Colombia, I naturally conceived the idea of dedicating it to you, who have been its Creator and Liberator, who have attained the chief magistracy therein, and whose name honors its most brilliant pages with deeds never to be forgotten. This was demanded by justice, gratitude, and admiration ; but something more has been required by friendship. In permitting me to place your name in front of the History of Colombia, you have exacted that I should dedicate it, not to the Liberator Pres-

name is connected with so many brilliant events in the history of Colombia, and who bears the proud title of 'creator and liberator of the republic.' It contains, also, a multitude of curious details concerning the earlier portion of his career, which are not to be found, at least not in the same exact and authentic shape, in any other book, with which we are acquainted. And inasmuch as Bolivar forms one of the great subjects of interest of the present day, we have thought we could not make any use of these volumes so well calculated to recommend them to public attention, as the compiling from them, in connexion with other sources of information within our reach, an account of his life, character, and political views.

To a portion of our hemisphere this is becoming a topic of deep, of fearful importance. Bolivar has been denounced in Buenos Ayres, Chile, and Peru, as an ambitious aspirant after universal power, aiming to terminate his career of victory by the conquest of all the free states of South America. In Colombia he is already supreme in rank, and invested with authority unlimited in scope as in duration. If his ultimate purposes are to usurp dominion over his native land, and by force of arms to extend the sceptre of military despotism over the neighboring countries, the youthful nations of the South may well regard his progress with mingled terror and hatred, uncertain how soon they shall become the helpless victims of a prosperous tyrant. But if, on the contrary, his professions truly indicate his intentions, and the latter are like the former, honest, patriotic, and just, then are his opinions and actions not less profoundly interesting, considered in reference to the condition of the people of Spanish America, and the future destiny of the new fraternity of republics in the South. And in countries not directly concerned in the solution of the problem which his character presents, he is necessarily an object of universal attention, as the prominent individual of the day, appearing before us clothed in all the *prestige* created by a long

ident of the Republic, but to my friend General Bolivar. Gratefully do I comply with this request, which at the same time that I regard it as sacred, fills me with the most profound respect and gratitude.

'I am

Your most devoted fellow citizen,
and obedient servant,

J. Manuel Restrepo.'

Bogota, June 3d, 1825.

career of military triumphs, the hero of the South American revolution, as Washington was of the North American and Napoleon of the French, and leaving it yet doubtful whether he shall be associated in fame with the Father of his Country, or with the fallen Conqueror and dethroned Usurper. We propose to give to this subject a dispassionate examination, which is the more necessary at the present moment, when the partial and distorted facts, and the rash judgments, continually coming to us through the medium of the public prints, have rendered that obscure and uncertain, which, impartially considered, is sufficiently clear and intelligible.

Simon Bolivar was born in the city of Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, July 24th, 1783. His father was Don Juan Vicente Bolivar y Ponte, who held the office inherited from his ancestors of *regidor alferes real* in the municipality of Caracas; and his mother Doña Maria Concepcion Palacios y Sojo; both of noble and distinguished families. He was left an orphan at an early age, when he had scarcely acquired the first elements of education. Dissatisfied with the means of gaining knowledge afforded by his native country, and anxious to improve himself by travel, and by access to the more extended intellectual advantages of the eastern continent, he embarked for Spain with the view of travelling in Europe, being one of the few natives of the Spanish colonies to whom this privilege was granted by the jealousy of the government. On the way to Europe he visited Mexico and Havana. After finishing his studies in Madrid, he traversed the south of Europe, visiting its principal cities, especially Paris, where he was an eye-witness of many of the important incidents of the revolution. Whilst in Paris, he is said to have rendered himself an acceptable guest in its gay circles, although his favorite occupation was the study of those departments of science, which were calculated to prepare him for the active duties of the soldier and statesman. And at this period it was, that he conceived the project of delivering his country from the cruel tyranny of the Spaniards.

On his return to Madrid, he married a lady of distinction, belonging to one of the first families in America. She was the daughter of Don N. Toro, uncle of the Marquiss of Toro in Caracas, and possessed those qualities which an excellent education in the court of Spain was fitted to impart. Bolivar conducted his lady to Caracas, and in the bosom of domestic tranquillity, devoted himself to the improvement of his extensive patrimonial

estates. At this time he obtained the commission of Captain in the militia in the valleys of Aragua. But his domestic happiness was destined to be of brief duration ; for his wife suddenly sickened of the yellow fever and died, leaving him inconsolable for her loss. To relieve his feelings from the pressure of grief, he again repaired to Europe, and by a chance, which, in reference to his subsequent fortunes, may be considered singular, he happened to be in Paris when Napoleon assumed the imperial diadem. What influence the sight of that imposing spectacle may have exercised over his ardent and excitable character, time alone can declare. His imagination might easily have been captivated by the surpassing splendor of a scene so extraordinary. Bolivar saw the child of destiny in his days of glory, when his star was culminating ; and it would not be wonderful if an event of such a nature, of which Bolivar was the eye-witness, should have made a more lasting impression on his mind than the terrible reverses which ere long followed, but which he knew only as matters of history. But of this, more in the sequel.

Bolivar was on his return to Caracas, visiting the United States by the way, during the period marked by the abdications of Charles and Ferdinand at Bayonne, so disastrous in their consequences to the Spanish monarchy. Soon after he reached Caracas, his intimate friend, the Spanish general Don Vicente Emparan, also arrived, in the capacity of Captain General of Venezuela, to which he was appointed, first by King Joseph, and afterwards by the Central Junta of Spain. Emparan's partiality to the new dynasty soon became generally known, through the means of Bolivar, and contributed to augment the disaffection of the leading inhabitants, who, notwithstanding their deep sense of the injustice of the Spanish government towards them, still entertained a certain feeling of loyalty towards Ferdinand personally, *el amado Fernando*. At length, on the nineteenth of April, 1810, the patriots of Caracas assumed the reins of government, placing the administration of affairs in the hands of a select body called the Supreme Junta, and seized the persons of Emperan and the members of the *audiencia*, who were immediately sent to the United States. These events constitute the commencement of the revolution in Venezuela ; and as Bolivar was one of the principal actors on this important occasion, his life is from the beginning in truth identified with the history of his country's independence. He received from the Junta the rank of Colonel, and was also commissioned, together with

Don Luis Lopez Mendez, to proceed to London, and solicit the protection of the English cabinet for the newly formed government of Venezuela. His mission being terminated by a declaration of perfect neutrality on the part of Great Britain, he returned to Caracas, and lived for a while in comparative retirement, owing to some dissatisfaction either with the measures of the government, or with the individuals by whom it was exercised. But his rank, talents, acquirements, and influence were steadily devoted to the object of effecting the separation of his country from Spain. The efforts of himself and other patriots at length produced the declaration of independence, July 5th, 1811, which was the signal for hostilities between the contending parties, and again called Bolivar into action in his appropriate sphere.

The Spanish regency had despatched the royal commissioner Cortobarria to Puerto Rico, with full powers to reduce Venezuela to subjection. In pursuance of a plan concerted in conjunction with him, the Spaniards, and others opposed to the new order of things, armed and embodied troops, took possession of Valencia, and raised the standard of revolt against the authority of the Congress. General Francisco Miranda was immediately despatched, at the head of three thousand men, to chastise the insurgents, and Bolivar joined his ranks as a volunteer, serving as a member of his staff, and in that capacity displaying his characteristic military talents and activity. Miranda dispersed the rebels in Valencia; and was only prevented, by the jealousy of the government, from doing the same with a body of the disaffected in Coro, who afterwards proved powerful opponents of the republican cause. For when the tremendous earthquake of March, 1812, filled Venezuela with ruins and mourning, the fanatical clergy, who were strongly addicted to the Spanish interests, eagerly embraced the opportunity of working upon the superstition of the people; and by ascribing that awful catastrophe to the vengeance of Heaven, indignant at the disloyalty of the patriots, they succeeded but too well in perverting the judgments of their bigoted and ignorant followers. Sustained by this circumstance, the royal troops under the captain general Monteverde assumed the offensive, and rapidly advanced from Coro for the west of Venezuela. The Congress, finding they now had to struggle for existence, had recourse to measures of corresponding decision. Setting an example which the South Americans have so repeatedly imitated since, they resolved to

confer on General Miranda the authority and name of Dictator, that he might prepare for the threatened emergency with all the energy of concentrated power. One of the earliest acts of his administration was to entrust the command of the important post of Puerto Cabello to Colonel Bolivar. But while Miranda's judicious conduct was sustaining the hopes of his party, they suffered a fatal disaster in a quarter where it was least anticipated. The Spanish prisoners confined in the castle of S. Felipe which commanded Puerto Cabello, succeeded, by corrupting the officer on guard, in obtaining possession of the castle; and thus obliged Bolivar to evacuate the place (July 1st, 1812), and to undergo the mortification of returning to Caracas, to communicate the unwelcome news to his general. The loss of Puerto Cabello gave such decided advantages to the royalists, that Miranda was driven to the necessity of concluding a capitulation with Monteverde, by virtue of which Venezuela was given up to the Spaniards, upon condition merely of immunity to the persons and property of individuals, three months being allowed to all such as desired to quit the country.

Relying upon the protection of this treaty, General Miranda, with the other leading patriots, including Bolivar, retired to La Guayra, for the purpose of embarking for Carthagená, and joining the cause of independence in New Granada. Unfortunately La Guayra was then commanded by Colonel Manuel Maria Casas, whose baseness and perfidy have consigned his name to the same immortality of infamy in South America, which distinguishes Benedict Arnold's in the North. To ingratiate himself with the Spaniards, he contrived to seize and deliver up his countrymen to their merciless enemies, by whom, in defiance of the most sacred rights, Miranda and more than a thousand others were thrown into dungeons at La Guayra and Puerto Cabello. The friends and enemies of Bolivar differ in their representations of the part he took in these melancholy transactions. Certain it is, that he was under the necessity of submitting to great sacrifices to regain his liberty; but he finally obtained a passport from Monteverde by special favor, and escaped to Curaçoa, from whence he took passage for Carthagená (September, 1812), and proffered his services to the republican government, in company with various other emigrants from Venezuela.

At this time, although the republicans were predominant in nearly the whole of New Granada, yet the royalists had posses-

sion of Santa Martha and Rio de la Hacha. It was all important that they should be driven from these positions, especially from Santa Martha, and a French officer, named Labatut, was employed on this service by the government of Carthagena. Being successful in forcing several of the enemy's positions in the province, he was appointed commander in chief on the river Magdalena, and gaining one advantage after another, in fact was fortunate enough to take Santa Martha, although he soon lost it again by his incapacity and folly. The government of Carthagena, little anticipating the brilliant fortune which awaited Bolivar, appointed him to the command of the little station of Barranca within the district committed to the adventurer Labatut, and of course regularly under his orders. But the active spirit of Bolivar prevented his remaining contented in the obscurity of a subordinate command, and led him to undertake, of his own authority, a movement of that bold conception, and vigorous, rapid execution, which afterwards became the great characteristics of his military genius, when he rose to be the trusted leader of the armies of independence.

By fortifying the town of Tenerife, the Spaniards were enabled to obstruct the navigation of the upper Magdalena. While, therefore, Labatut was seeking to reduce Santa Martha, Bolivar prepared a little expedition with such scanty resources as he could collect, suddenly attacked the Spaniards in Tenerife, drove them before him, and gathering an accession of forces as he proceeded, continued his victorious march to Mompox, dispersing the hostile parties which occupied various positions on the eastern bank of the Magdalena (December, 1812). Labatut, who had given no orders for this expedition, and who felt jealous of the reputation Bolivar was acquiring, loudly demanded that he should be subjected to trial before a court martial for his unauthorized procedure. But the government of Carthagena justly appreciated Labatut's motives, and wisely protected Bolivar in an assumption of power, which he was using so advantageously. Meanwhile he was recognised at Mompox as 'commandant of arms' in the district; and having obtained a reinforcement of regular troops, militia, and gun-boats, he resolved, ascending the Magdalena, to penetrate into the interior of the province, having now a body of five hundred men under his command. The Spaniards, who had boasted that they would not even respect a flag of truce, fled in disorder before him to Chiriguaná, where they were overtaken and dispersed,

their commanders Capmani and Capdevila escaping with difficulty. The result of this expedition was the deliverance of the city of Ocaña, which Bolivar entered in triumph, amid the *vivas* and acclamations of the oppressed inhabitants (January, 1813).

Bolivar's arrival in Ocaña was, indeed, at a most opportune moment; for a division of the Spanish army under Correa was preparing to penetrate into New Granada, which, torn by civil dissensions, possessing few able officers, and destitute of adequate munitions of war, was in no state to withstand the coming foe. The Congress of New Granada had committed this task to Colonel Manuel Castillo, the commandant of Pamplona, who immediately applied to Bolivar for assistance in defending Pamplona and Cúcuta. As Bolivar depended on the government of Carthagena, he waited to obtain their consent, and meanwhile rapidly traversed the whole line of the Magdalena to Mompox, collecting arms and ammunition, and information concerning the positions and force of the enemy. He now conceived the daring project of reconquering Venezuela. Filled with enthusiasm himself, and having inspired his little army with the same noble sentiments, he took the field with only four hundred men, and a few additional musquets for arming Castillo's battalion. From Ocaña, he proceeded by the rough road across the lofty Cordillera which stretches along the province of Santa Martha, directing his march towards the city of Salazar de las Palmas. Spreading a false report of the strength of his army, he caused the enemy to abandon an impregnable position upon the heights of La Aguada, and every successive point at which they rallied, until he reached San Cayetano. None of these advantages cost him a drop of blood; being all owing to the celerity of his movements, to his intrepidity, and the superiority of his genius in the art of war. At length Correa concentrated his diminished and weary forces in the city of San José de Cúcuta, where Bolivar resolved to attack him in his quarters, notwithstanding the superiority of his numbers. The battle was fought with great obstinacy, and with doubtful success, until Bolivar commanded his followers to charge with bayonets, and the impetuosity of their attack decided the victory in his favor (February 28th, 1813). The Spanish troops sustained a total rout, leaving all their artillery, munitions, and baggage to the conquerors. Correa himself escaped, although badly wounded; but the patriots gained an immense booty in merchandise, which the merchants of

Maracaybo, supposing the conquest of New Granada certain, had caused to be conveyed to Cúcuta for sale. The victory was of immense importance, therefore, to New Granada, by freeing the valleys of Cúcuta of the presence of a dangerous enemy, and completely defeating the object of the Spaniards in organizing Correa's expedition.

All eyes were now turned on the fortunate individual, who, by the mere force of personal talent, had, in so short a period, achieved such brilliant success. The Congress of New Granada immediately appointed him to the rank of brigadier in the service of the Union, accompanying the commission with the most flattering expressions of confidence and applause. He was now a marked man. Torres, the president of Congress, and virtual head of the government, entertained from this period the highest anticipations of Bolivar's future career, and became a steady and useful friend to his interest. Stimulated by the reputation he had so quickly acquired, Bolivar was impatient to march upon Venezuela, representing the enterprise of expelling the Spaniards as easy on account of the discontent of the people, and as necessary to the security of New Granada. But his preparations did not proceed tranquilly or smoothly. Reverses were suffered by the patriots of Carthagena, who lost possession again of Santa Martha, and made a requisition upon Bolivar for the troops of Mompox. But a more serious difficulty occurred by reason of a difference between Castillo, the commandant of Pamplona, and Bolivar, whose command was within Castillo's military district, and by strange absurdity of arrangement was neither entirely dependent on, nor entirely independent of Castillo. As this affair illustrates the character of Bolivar, and was of important influence on his fortunes at a later period, it deserves to be explained and understood here.

Castillo was a man of small capacity and contracted views, unable to look beyond the little routine of his office, and wholly unfit for anything but garrison duty or a subordinate station, where he might have rendered himself useful. Assuming authority as commandant of Pamplona, he took upon him to censure Bolivar for his want of economy, and for the supposed disorder which reigned among his troops. New cause of jealousy arose in consequence of Bolivar's declining to subject the troops of Carthagena to the orders of the Congress, and disclaiming all connexion with the political disputes of the various provinces. Bolivar sought to avoid a serious rupture with Cas-

tillo by all reasonable advances to accommodation ; but without success. An angry correspondence ensued, and appeals on each side to the authority of the Congress produced nothing but mutual criminations, which served to render the breach irreparable. The principal charges of Castillo against Bolivar were, that he preserved no order in his division ; that he suffered all the booty captured in Cúcuta to be dissipated foolishly ; in fine, that he thought of undertaking the delivery of Venezuela without the necessary troops and resources, and would thus sacrifice the soldiers of the Union in a rash and impracticable enterprise. Bolivar, on the other hand, accused Castillo of introducing discord from envious motives, of being destitute of capacity, incapable of executing anything useful, and of losing the season for action in idle observance of misplaced rules of order.

Probably the imputations of both parties were not without foundation. Monteverde then had possession of Venezuela with six thousand men, while Bolivar's troops amounted to hardly a thousand. Most persons, therefore, considered his plan as rash and wild, characterizing his project as worthy only of a desperate man, ready to venture everything upon a single hazard. His military credit was not yet established, and while his personal intrepidity, the boldness of his designs, and his great activity, were universally admitted, the admission was coupled with accusations of temerity, of want of economy, and of permitting the resources of the troops to be dissipated. But Bolivar himself never doubted for a moment of the result, provided the enterprise was conducted with boldness and celerity ; and he succeeded in prevailing upon the Congress to authorize his advance into Venezuela. In the progress of that expedition, as on later occasions, it sufficiently appeared that in this case, as in many others of the same kind, Bolivar's views were distrusted only because they were in advance of his cotemporaries and associates. Whether Bolivar caught the idea from observation of the military policy of Napoleon, or whether like circumstances suggested to him a like system of operations, and so render him equally deserving of the praise of originality of genius, we know not ; but certain it is, that a striking similitude is to be seen in the tactics which they both adopted. Bolivar broke loose at once from the shackles of military routine which enslaved the Spanish officers. He astonished them by forced marches over roads previously deemed impracticable to a reg-

ular army. While they were manœuvering, hesitating, calculating, guarding the customary avenues of approach, he surprised them by concentrating a superior force upon a point where they least expected an attack, cut up their troops in detail, and substituted a system of rapid and brilliant evolutions for the tardy movements of his predecessors. To do this, however, it was necessary that much apparent, and some real disorder should introduce itself into the commissariat of his army, to so marked a degree at least, as to outrage the notions of such a narrow-minded formalist as Castillo.

In these observations, we have somewhat anticipated the course of events; but they are material to the understanding of Bolivar's actual position, and of his character as a soldier. Notwithstanding the obstacles interposed by Castillo and others, he did obtain permission to enter Venezuela, by means of the strong representations of the practicability of his plan, which he addressed to the Congress of New Granada. Castillo coöperated with him in the outset, and was usefully employed in driving Correa from La Grita; but at length, declaring that he could no longer lend his countenance to an expedition so wild, he resigned his commission, after marching his detachment of the troops back to Tunja. The government appointed commissioners to accompany Bolivar, and direct his operations; but the celerity of his movements prevented their joining him; for when they reached Cúcuta, he had already pushed his little army, now reduced to about five hundred men, into the heart of the province of Merida, and was proceeding onward unincumbered by commissioners or troublesome associates in command. Previous to his departure, however, and while he was making his preparations at Cúcuta, a Venezuelan officer, Colonel Briceño, had collected a small party of cavalry, and set out for the city of San Cristobal on his own authority, although he had promised to submit himself to Bolivar's orders. (April, 1813.) Hardly had he arrived there, when, thinking to strike terror into the Spaniards, he issued a gasconading proclamation, declaring war *á muerte* against them, and offering liberty to such of their slaves as should kill their masters. Regardless of consequences, he penetrated with his little party as far as Guadalito, where he was met and routed by the Spaniards under Tiscar, who, in revenge of his conduct, ordered him and sixteen of his officers with a number of the inhabitants of Barinas to be shot in that city as rebels. Briceño's absurd

proclamation occasioned Bolivar much uneasiness, because he himself was censured as responsible for it, until the atrocious procedure of the Spaniards became known.

This unpleasant affair, and a multitude of other causes of embarrassment, being finally disposed of, Bolivar commenced his march from San Cristobal, with an army, small indeed for the mighty task they were undertaking, but commanded by such officers as Rivas, Jirardot, Urdaneta, D'Eluyar, and others worthy to be associated with Bolivar. He rapidly advanced towards Trujillo, driving the scattered fragments of Correa's force before him; and learning on the way that the patriots of Merida had risen upon the Spaniards on hearing of his approach, he entered that place, and reëstablished the republican government as it had previously existed (July 5th, 1813). Meantime his vanguard, commanded by Jirardot, occupied Trujillo, after a desperate but successful engagement with the last relics of the Spanish force in that quarter. Thus the two provinces of Merida and Trujillo remained entirely free; and Bolivar was enabled to obtain such intelligence of the state of Venezuela as to convince him that the happy termination of his enterprise depended solely on the celerity and decision of his movements; as any delay would not only occasion the consumption of his own resources, but would give the enemy opportunity to recover from their surprise and collect their troops. His measures were accordingly taken with energy and despatch corresponding to the importance of the emergency, and he labored with incredible activity in augmenting his little army with recruits, and thus preparing for the desperate struggle involved in his ulterior movements. And ere he left Trujillo, circumstances occurred, which gave to the war a character of peculiar desperation. We allude to the declaration of *guerra á muerte* made by Bolivar, which, as it is spoken of more frequently than it is understood, requires proper explanation in this place.

In Merida and Trujillo, Bolivar received exact information of the enormities practised in Venezuela by Monteverde and his satellites. So far as Monteverde acted under positive instructions from the Spanish government, the latter might be considered more especially responsible; and their instructions amounted to the declaration of a war of extermination against the patriots of Venezuela. Spain regarded all the patriots in the light of traitors and rebels found in arms against the king. Hence her obstinacy in refusing to enter into any convention

with them ; hence the contempt of her officers for the most solemn capitulations, on the ground that no agreement made with traitors is obligatory ; hence their rejection of proposals for the exchange of prisoners, under circumstances the most favorable to themselves ; hence their atrocity in shooting in cold blood the officers or political chiefs of the republicans, and frequently also every soldier that fell into their hands, by way of making fit examples of public justice. All this afforded ample justification for acts of reprisal, the only method by which, in a state of war, such violations of national law can be met by the suffering party. But Monteverde, or persons acting under his authority, committed innumerable other acts of gratuitous cruelty upon the unhappy Venezuelans, more becoming a fiend than a human being. In defiance of a solemn capitulation securing perfect immunity to persons and property, villages were sacked and edifices burned ; multitudes of respectable individuals were thrown into miserable and noisome dungeons in company with the basest felons, loaded with fetters, mutilated in wonton barbarity, shot, or subjected to a more ignominious death ; in short, no device of ingenious persécution was left untried upon the wretched inhabitants. The state of things could not have been worse, if Venezuela had been taken possession of by a savage enemy, sword in hand, for the purposes of predatory conquest or devastation. Happily this infatuated policy, impolitic as it was iniquitous, awoke a spirit of resistance and of vengeance in the bosoms of the Venezuelans, which ensured their independence. All the horrible particulars came to Bolivar's knowledge on his entering Venezuela. At the same time he received information of the recent butcheries in Barinas, which, as happening partly in consequence of his own enterprise, he deemed himself more immediately called upon to notice.

In such circumstances of extreme irritation was this celebrated declaration issued, under date of Merida, June 8th, 1813. It was the terrible resource of a season of despair. It is couched in the most passionate language of outraged feelings, smarting under the sense of unprecedented wrongs, and breathes a spirit of vindictive resentment, which nothing but the horrors of such a warfare could have kindled in the human breast. The document is before us, with another proclamation of the same tenor issued at Trujillo, July 15th, 1813, and a justificatory letter of Bolivar's on the subject written subsequent-

ly. These papers are in no better taste than Bolivar's recent proclamations and other state papers; being characterized by the same declamatory, turgid style, and carrying the inflated idiom of the Spanish language to the extreme limits of propriety; but it is impossible to peruse them without perceiving the marks of no ordinary mind in every page. After stating the purpose of the expedition, and denouncing the general character of the Spaniards in America, the first proclamation concludes thus;

'The executioners, who entitle themselves our enemies, have violated the sacred rights of nations in Quito, La Paz, Mexico, Caracas, and recently in Popayan. They sacrificed in their dungeons our virtuous brethren in the cities of Quito and La Paz, they beheaded thousands of them, prisoners in Mexico; they buried alive in the subterranean vaults and pontons of Puerto Cabello and La Guayra our fathers, children, and friends of Venezuela; they have immolated the president and commandant of Popayan with all their companions in misfortune; and ultimately, oh God! as it were in our very presence, they have perpetrated a horrid butchery in Barinas of our fellow soldiers made prisoners of war, and of our peaceful compatriots of that city. But these victims shall be avenged, these executioners shall be exterminated. Our gentleness is already exhausted; and since our oppressors force us to a mortal struggle, they shall disappear from America, and our soil shall be purged of the monsters that infest it. Our hatred shall be implacable, and the war shall be unto death.'

It should be added that this did not import the indiscriminating massacre of all the prisoners in cold blood; but only that since the Spaniards had treated the patriots as rebels apprehended in arms, the extreme right of retaliation should be used upon Spaniards in the same circumstances. This declaration has been differently characterized, being lauded to the skies by some as an act of superior discernment, and of prime efficacy in securing the independence of the country, and not less warmly denounced by others as an act of desperation and barbarism. Impartial historians must regard it as one of those extreme and doubtful instances of military discretion, to be justified at any time only by establishing a case of most imperious necessity, such as may excuse a departure from all the ordinary rules of warfare among civilized nations. It is impossible to deny, however, that if an occasion ever existed, which could authorize the application of such violent remedies, it was this, where the agents of the

mother country had, in defiance of the most sacred obligations, absolutely rioted in tyranny and bloodshed.

To return to our narrative. Bolivar ascertaining the favorable aspect of things in Venezuela in consequence of Monteverde's tyranny, directed his attention towards the province of Barinas, then occupied by a Spanish force of two thousand men under Don Antonio Tiscar, destined for the invasion of New Granada. When Tiscar was informed that Bolivar, in his rapid advance upon Trujillo, had followed the road westward of the Cordillera of the Andes between that and the lake of Maracaybo, he determined to cross the mountain in two points and intercept Bolivar's communication with Cúcuta, sending one detachment to Merida under Don José Martí, and holding another in readiness at Guadualito under Don Jose Yañez. Discovering Tiscar's plan, Bolivar despatched his rearguard under Rivas with orders to engage Martí, and daringly threw himself into Guanare, thus intercepting Tiscar's communication with Caracas. The happiest result attended this bold manœuvre. Rivas obtained a brilliant victory over Martí on the heights of Niquitao, absolutely destroying his detachment; and Bolivar took possession of Guanare by surprise, obtaining a large and valuable booty; while his vanguard under Jirardot vigorously pursued Tiscar, who, separated from Martí and Yañez, fled with his troops in confusion to Nutrias and embarked for Guayana. Of all his army nothing remained but scattered fragments of the corps, which, collecting under Yañez, retired into the remote plains of the Apure. Thus Bolivar accomplished his first object, of dispersing the Spaniards nearest New Granada, which, now freed from the apprehension of invasion, acknowledged at last the justness of Bolivar's views; and president Torres acquired much credit for having sustained him against all the attacks and intrigues of his enemies.

Bolivar now divided his army, which had increased considerably during his late operations, into two divisions, and directed their march towards Caracas through the provinces of Trujillo and Barinas. Several engagements were fought, before Monteverde collected his forces for a decisive trial of strength. At last he assembled his best troops at Lastoguanes, and sustained a total defeat, in consequence of which he was obliged to shut himself up in Puerto Cabello, and Bolivar obtained possession of Caracas by the capitulation of the Spanish governor. He continued his career of victory in Venezuela, while Mariño was

effecting the deliverance of the eastern provinces; and with such glorious success, that in August (1813) Puerto Cabello alone remained in the possession of the Spaniards, and Bolivar was justly hailed as the 'Liberator' of Venezuela. Monteverde received a reinforcement of troops from Spain, and again took the field, refusing all exchanges of prisoners, disregarding the ordinary rules of warfare, and giving to the contest a character of unprecedented desperation and ferocity. But one victory after another crowned the arms of the patriots; and at the close of the year Venezuela still continued to be independent. During this period all the powers of government were vested in Bolivar alone, who, acting under the advice of the magistrates and principal citizens of Caracas, retained the dictatorial authority which he derived from his situation as general of the liberating army. It is not alleged that he himself abused his authority at any time; but complaints existed against the conduct of his inferior officers, who sometimes made the people feel the inconvenience of military rule, and the absence of all regular civil government. No good, however, could have resulted from the convocation of the Congress; for the measures adopted by the Spaniards at the beginning of 1814 proved fatal to the cause of Bolivar and the patriots.

To relate all the military operations in which Bolivar was concerned during the second period of his invasion of Venezuela, would be to give the history of the war itself, which it is not our intention to do any further than is necessary to present a connected view of Bolivar's life. The Spaniards, it is well known, unable to maintain their power in Venezuela by fair means, resolved to lay waste the country, and to carry on a partisan warfare until they could gather strength to take the field anew. To accomplish this, Boves, Yañez, Rosette, Puy, Palomo, and others, men of desperate and reckless character, were supplied with arms and ammunition, and, to fill their ranks, the slave population of Venezuela was called to the Spanish standard. By these means, guerilla parties, composed of vagabonds, outlaws, fugitive slaves, troops of base and lawless miscreants, such as infest a distracted country in times of war and civil commotion, were gathered under the command of leaders worthy of them, and presented a force formidable for their numbers but still more for their ferocity. Against these enemies Bolivar contended with spirit and vigor, and on the whole with decided advantage. Venezuela might, perhaps, have defended

herself successfully, but for the resources possessed by Boves and Yañez in the plains of Barinas, whither, as we stated before, the latter took refuge when Bolivar dispersed the forces of Tiscar, and where they served as a rallying point for the remnants of the regular royalist party. Though repeatedly vanquished by Bolivar, Urdaneta, Mariño, and others, they as often rallied ; and the arrival of Cajigal, as successor to Monteverde, with reinforcements from Coro added to their strength. At last, Bolivar was so unfortunate as to be attacked in an unfavorable position by Boves at La Puerta, and after an obstinate contest, was obliged to yield the victory. Reanimated by this signal advantage, the Spaniards united their forces, and compelled Mariño to retreat to Cumaná. In the confusion which ensued, the patriots lost all the fruits of a year of desperate and unceasing contention with their implacable enemies. In July (1814), Boves entered Caracas, deserted by the best of its population, who justly dreaded the barbarity of the royalists. Bolivar took the field once more at Aragua (August 17th, 1814), and was again beaten by Morales, the second in command to Boves. Anarchy and division now reigned among the republican ranks. Bolivar had contended while hope remained ; but unable any longer to make head against the bloody and disastrous warfare which desolated his country, he abandoned it a second time, stripped of everything but the glory of his heroic attempt.

On his arrival at Carthagena, he found his old enemy Castillo in the possession of great influence there, and busy in ascribing the loss of Venezuela not to the fortune of war, but to his mismanagement. Bolivar immediately repaired to Tunja, where the Congress of New Granada was in session, to submit his conduct to their judgment. He was received with every mark of consideration by the members of the government, who, in spite of the efforts of his evil-wishers, justly regarded him as a great man, although an unfortunate general, and testified their confidence in his abilities by employing him upon a commission somewhat remarkable in its nature. To comprehend this, it is necessary to call to mind the political situation of New Granada. All the free provinces, except Cundinamarca, had formed a confederacy in imitation of the first confederacy of the United States, governed by a Congress. Cundinamarca, the most opulent and powerful of the provinces, including Bogotá, and all the resources of that ancient capital of the viceroyalty, acting

under the authority of Don Antonio Nariño, a patriot whose talents and sufferings gave him extraordinary personal influence, constantly maintained the necessity of a central form of government and refused to accede to the federal league. This difference was accommodated for a time, on occasion of an expedition against the royalists of Pasto, which the Congress committed to Nariño, and which failed, almost in the very moment of ultimate success, in consequence of the misconduct of his principal officer. Nariño was taken prisoner by the Spaniards; and his kinsman Alvarez succeeded him as president and dictator of Cundinamarca. Alvarez not only kept aloof from the Union, but fell into a system of arbitrary and illegal government, wholly at variance with the fundamental laws of the republic. The evil finally became too great longer to be borne. The Congress perceived that Cundinamarca was likely to be given over to a faction inimical to liberty; that the resources of the nation were crippled by the persevering secession of the central province, without which the Union could never be consolidated; and that the case required, and would fully justify, the employment of force to compel Cundinamarca to become an integral part of the Union. Troops were accordingly assembled, and the command entrusted to Bolivar, for the purpose of effecting this object.

Such was the delicate enterprise, of which Bolivar received the direction. He set out from Tunja at the head of thirteen hundred troops of the line and five hundred of militia composed of cavalry, and continued his march without opposition to the hacienda of Techo, a league and a half from Bogotá, where he pitched his camp. Various attempts had already been made by the Congress to effect an accommodation; and Bolivar repeated the offer once more, preparatory to laying siege to the city. But his advances produced not the least influence upon Alvarez, whose mind was made up to try the hazard of arms; and Bolivar had no alternative but to resume his march for the attack of Santa Fé (December 10th, 1814). Notwithstanding the vigorous resistance which he encountered, Bolivar drove in all the outposts of the besieged the first day, and took the barrier of Santa Barbara by assault, by which means the line of circumvallation was completely established. The next day he captured the battery of San Victorino, and penetrated into the city, so as to occupy the whole of it except the great square, where the besieged entrenched themselves, with a park of

artillery. Bolivar's troops were obliged to advance foot by foot, meeting with the most determined resistance at every house and street which they successively attacked. Finally preparations were made for the ensuing day (December 12th), to assault the great square of Bogotá, the only part of the city of which Alvarez and the troops of Cundinamarca retained possession. Both parties, wearied by the violence of the contest, felt willing to escape the horrors of the last assault; and Bolivar cheerfully acceded to a proposal for capitulation made by Alvarez, who conceded the whole question in dispute. To heal the differences which had so long existed between the two parties, the authorities of Cundinamarca immediately invited the Congress to transfer its sessions from Tunja to Bogotá; which they accordingly did; and the consolidation of the Union was thus happily accomplished.

Bogotá sustained very considerable injury in the course of the military operations of which it was the occasion and the scene. Two days of desperate fighting in the very centre of a populous city, could not but prove greatly detrimental to its public and private edifices, beside the loss of lives which it necessarily occasioned. In the latter respect, the besiegers suffered most, because, advancing in small parties through the streets, they were liable to be attacked at great disadvantage from the houses and cross streets, owing to the greater knowledge of localities possessed by the besieged. But, in other respects, the city suffered most. Indeed, one quarter, the barrier of Santa Barbara, was absolutely sacked; for as the assailants gained it inch by inch at the point of the bayonet, it was impossible wholly to restrain their license. But nothing created such serious regret as the loss of the manuscripts, books, and collections, and instruments which the care and industry of the celebrated Dr Mutiz and the astronomer Caldas had accumulated in the observatory belonging to the botanical expedition. A battalion of the rough Venezuelan troops belonging to Bolivar fixed themselves in this position, from which they greatly annoyed the besieged; whereupon the latter planted a cannon in the gallery of the palace formerly occupied by the viceroys, and with it battered the observatory; so that between the fire of one party, and the violence of the other, everything which the building contained became a prey to ruin.

At the commencement of the expedition Bolivar was vehemently censured by the inhabitants of Bogotá, and excommuni-

cated by the ecclesiastical authorities; but after it was over, they did justice to the manner in which he conducted the attack, by the most marked testimonials of respect. The government of the Union, as it may be supposed, manifested the deepest gratitude for the important service he had rendered; and in reward of the wisdom, prudence, and courage displayed by him in the campaign, they sent him a letter of thanks containing the most flattering expressions of admiration, with a commission, the first they had granted, of Captain General of the armies of the Republic. Attentive observers must remark, in this affair, another striking resemblance between the fortunes of Napoleon and Bolivar. The attack on the sections of Paris was to the former, in the career of advancement, what the expedition of the latter was, against the city of Bogotá. Each enterprise proved equally efficacious in securing the political ascendancy of the body and of the party in whose favor it was undertaken; and each was equally beneficial to the successful general, who hazarded his reputation upon the attempt.

Bolivar having made arrangements for the organization of the army, and for maintaining tranquillity at Santa Fé, repaired to Tunja to agree with the government upon a plan of campaign suited to the exigencies of the Union. It was resolved to attempt the capture of Santa Martha, which was now in possession of the royalists, and afterwards to march upon Rio Hacha and Maracaybo, thus securing the northern coast of New Granada. To accomplish this it was necessary to obtain from Carthagena a portion of the abundant munitions of war, which it contained. His army consisted of two thousand men, the greater portion of them veteran soldiers inured to war, from whose number and quality, and from the talents of their leader, high expectations were drawn of a brilliant campaign. Bolivar left Santa Fé with a military chest supplied for four months, and every other necessary in abundance except munitions of war. In the latter he was exceedingly deficient, possessing only five hundred muskets, and nothing but orders of the general government upon Carthagena for the residue of the munitions of war required for the expedition. These flattering and not unreasonable hopes were destined to be disappointed by the insane folly of the authorities of Carthagena, particularly Amador, governor of the state, and Manuel Castillo, commandant of arms.

Castillo, as we have already seen, was the rancorous personal enemy of Bolivar; and his enmity seems to have been as in-

veterate as it was unjust. Hearing of Bolivar's appointment, he published a manifesto, consisting of an atrocious libel upon his public and private life, impeaching his honor, talents, and even his personal courage; in short, everything great or estimable in his character. Deeply wounded by this extraordinary act, Bolivar addressed letters to Garcia Rovira, president of the United Provinces, and Camilo Torres, former president of the Congress; and their answers, containing the fullest refutation of Castillo's slanders, were published as an antidote to his manifesto. Not content with this, he sought to gain the good will of Castillo by soliciting for him a commission of Brigadier General. The general government adopted the idea, and appointed him to a place in the council of war, in order to remove all occasion of collision between him and the object of his hatred. But instead of corresponding to these conciliatory advances, the authorities of Carthagena insisted upon retaining Castillo among them, and even sought to force him upon the government as commander of the expedition against Santa Martha instead of Bolivar. Nay, regardless of their obligations to the Union, they addressed circulars to the various commandants on the river Magdalena, ordering them to refuse obedience to Bolivar, and not to allow him to advance further than Mompox with his troops. Castillo, lest he should be outdone in madness by his associates, actually commanded the officers on the Magdalena to withstand the troops of the Union by force. Such a procedure was unpardonably criminal in Castillo, as it was a declaration of civil war against the Union occasioned solely by personal animosity towards Bolivar; and the consequences were most disastrous to Carthagena, and indeed all New Granada.

Alarmed by the indications of approaching discórd, the Congress despatched one of its members, Dr Juan Marimon, as a commissioner with full power to settle the differences between Castillo and Bolivar. Meanwhile the latter descended the Magdalena to Mompox, which was friendly to him, and from that place directed a message to Castillo, requesting the necessary aid for the reconquest of Santa Martha (February 10th, 1815). But Castillo, of course, evaded the requisition, and immediately commenced the most active preparations for war. Bolivar made the greatest exertions to effect an arrangement; and might, perhaps, have accomplished it, had Marimon performed his duty to the nation, instead of becoming the blind instrument of

Castillo's faction. At last, perceiving that his troops were sickening and dying in the pestilential climate of Mompox, and that his time and resources were wasting in vain, Bolivar determined to pursue his march towards Carthagena. This step was regarded by Castillo and his faction as a hostile invasion of the city ; and led them to adopt such rash and violent measures of insult and opposition, that Bolivar, who had thus far been wholly in the right, wearied out by the implacable enmity of the authorities of Carthagena, adopted the unfortunate resolution of laying close siege to the city, and compelling a compliance with the wishes of the Congress. If there is any important act of his public life, during the war of independence, which more peculiarly deserves reprobation, it is this ; for, great as the provocation was, it would have been more worthy of Bolivar to abstain from commencing hostilities.

It is unnecessary to enter into the particulars of the siege. One thing, however, deserves to be mentioned, as indicating the different spirit which actuated the contending parties. Bolivar generously confined his operations to merely forming a line around the city, and maintaining the defensive in the points which he occupied, hoping that the besieged would cease their opposition to the views of the Congress. The authorities of Carthagena, on the other hand, descended to the basest means of annoying Bolivar and his troops, such as poisoning the water in the vicinity of his camp, firing upon his flags of truce, and otherwise proceeding in violation of all the rules of honorable warfare. The siege had continued for nearly a month, without producing any beneficial result, although Bolivar earnestly and constantly solicited an accommodation in any shape consistent with his honor ; when the calamitous news of the arrival of Morillo from Spain, with an army of ten thousand men and a powerful fleet, destined for the reduction of New Granada, filled both parties with consternation, and produced an immediate cessation of hostilities. Bolivar now urged with redoubled force the necessity of instantly proceeding to Santa Martha, and sacrificing all personal differences on the altar of patriotism ere it was too late, and ere Morillo directed his overwhelming forces against Carthagena itself, which, unless prompt measures of defence were adopted, must look to be the first victim of the vengeance of the Spaniards. Finding it in vain to expect anything like reason or justice from the faction which governed Carthagena, he came to the resolution of throwing up

his command, and leaving a country where the prejudices of the people and the enmity of the leading individuals rendered it impossible that his services could be useful. He therefore concluded a treaty with Carthagená without delay ; and relinquishing the command of the army to general Palacios, he embarked for Jamaica, accompanied only by a few of his attached friends (May 8th, 1815).

At this moment, how bitter must have been the emotions of Bolívar. His native land, Venezuela, was consigned to the fate of a conquered country. Carthagená, which might have profited by his military talents, had compelled him to abandon the field of honor in New Granada, at the very time when he, and such as he, were indispensable to its salvation. In his last letter to the government of the Union he expresses these sentiments in the most feeling manner. To sacrifice his command, his fortune, his future glory, he said, cost him no exertion. It was necessary, to give peace to a distracted country. In separating himself from his friends, his comrades in victory and honor, he lamented only that he could no longer hazard his life in the cause of his bleeding country, which was dearer to him than anything upon earth. Yet the very circumstance, that he was driven at this time into voluntary exile probably was the means of preserving his life for new scenes of glory ; for had he remained in New Granada, there is every reason to believe, judging from the fate of other prominent men of the day, and according to the ordinary chances of war, that he would have fallen in battle or become a victim of legal proscription, during Morillo's reign of bloodshed.

Bolívar was received in Kingston, upon his arrival in that place, with the respect and consideration due to his character, and there awaited a favorable moment for again taking an active part in the revolutionary war. While residing in the island of Jamaica, he published a short defence of his conduct in the civil war of Carthagená, and various other papers, calculated to promote the cause of American independence abroad. Meanwhile, an incident occurred, which showed how much his talents and zeal were dreaded by his enemies. A Spaniard, in the pay of a royalist chief on the Main, repaired to Kingston, in order to effect his assassination ; and seduced a negro slave, belonging to one of his aids, to attempt the nefarious deed. Fortunately, on the night appointed for the assassination, Bolívar happened to be absent from his lodgings, not having returned from an

evening party to which he was invited ; and a poor emigrant, of the name of Amestoy, occupied his bed. The slave entered the room ignorant of this circumstance, and plunged his dagger into the breast of the stranger, who died under the blow. The Spaniard who instigated the murder, took his measures so well, that his name could not be ascertained ; but the slave was apprehended in the fact, and atoned for his crime on the scaffold. Bolivar remained at Kingston until the end of the year, when he departed for Aux Cayes to organize his celebrated expedition for the invasion and conquest of Venezuela. But, admonished by the length to which this article has unexpectedly reached, we find it necessary to break off here, hoping to resume the subject in a subsequent number, and give an account of that portion of Bolivar's life, when the Spaniards were completely vanquished, and his political opinions came to be a matter of importance to his country.

ART. XII.—*Reise seiner Hoheit des Herzogs BERNHARD ZU SACHSEN-WEIMAR-EISENACH durch Nord-America in den Jahren 1825 und 1826.* Herausgegeben von Heinrich Luden. Weimar. 1828.

Travels through North America, during the Years 1825 and 1826. By his Highness, BERNHARD, DUKE OF SAXE-WEIMAR-EISENACH. In Two Volumes. Philadelphia. 1828.

THE general character, displayed in these volumes, is that of a philanthropic and sensible observer. The merit which they possess is in part negative. They are not written in a spirit of haughtiness and intolerance ; the author neither affects to disdain nor to admire republican institutions. He never indulges in satire, and is never pert or malignant. We lay down the volume, with respect for his moral worth and general fairness and candor.

But a book to be interesting needs much more. We have here no general views, no acute observations on social or political life among us. The account which is given of some of our cities is exceedingly meagre, and contains little beyond a chronicle of visits. A very large proportion of the Travels is